Bushy

Original Composition: 21 June 2007


I am a Republican,
A Ronald Reagan Republican,
am I.

And now,
would I, could I,
be a Republican?

Yes, I said,
a Republican am I.

And yet, and yet,
When George Bush is a Republican
What am I?

I am not a Bush.
No not a Bush,
not I.

Not today, not tomorrow, not any day.
Not here, not there, not anywhere.

Not with a son,
Not with a daughter,
Not with a sister, and
Not with a brother.
Not with a nephew, and
Not even with a niece.
Not with a cousin,
No Sir,
Not with a dozen.

I am not a Bush.
Not a Bush am I.

Not today, not tomorrow, not any day.
Not here, not there, not anywhere.

A Bush, not ever, not never again.

So what am I?
A Ronald Reagan Republican,
Am I.

A Kurdistan Solution for Iraq

Originally composed: 20 October 2006

There has been no paucity of pundits, book dealers, administration officials, and the usual political machinations, as to how the United States and it’s coalition partners are “losing” the war in Iraq and what is now the best solution for the Iraqi conflict.

The Bush Administration has made it easy to oppose this conflict. “Stay the course” is a bankrupt military strategy. It can be a useful political strategy, but only when common perception validates the strategy. Reality and a careful and thoughtful understanding of Iraq invalidate the Bush Administration’s scheme. There was a worthy policy objective -- taking the War on Terrorism to the Jihadists in their own backyard, freeing the majority Shia and Kurdish populations from a brutal and genocidal dictator, and perhaps ridding the world from weapons of mass destruction. But, a worthy policy with puny results is a classic failure of implementation. One has to wonder whom did the implementation estimate for this mess. Still, we are where we are, and the question now is what is to be done.

Peter Galbraith has posited that the best United States strategy for Iraq was the concentration of US forces on the part of Iraq where the US mission has succeeded - Kurdistan. Kurdistan is the right solution to this conflict. Here are the reasons why.
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First, military bases in Kurdistan can be used to launch strikes (or conduct a campaign) in Iraq and if necessary throughout the Middle East. A powerful US presence would also serve as a deterrent to others in the region with expansionist intentions.

Second, it would support a new democratic republic in the Middle East. Democracy is not given to a people - the people win it. The Kurds seem to be the only group in Iraq who stand where they sit. A secure Kurdistan (Mosul Province) also would serve as a model for what success looks like.

Third, reducing our exposure and concentrating our troops in Kurdistan, will be less costly than our current failed strategy of being everywhere and nowhere and waiting for the “Iraqi Army” to bring peace and stability to a Nation in name only. It is now quite clear that the Bush Administration does not have the will to win this conflict. Allowing your enemy to use civilian neighborhoods as safe-havens is a no-win fate. It is illogical to believe that you can fight and destroy your enemy while simultaneously protect the “noncombatants” who are themselves hostile to US and coalition forces. The Russians understand this and so too do the Israelis.

Fourth, the hell with what Turkey thinks - they have had every opportunity for partnership and constructive intervention in the region and have never failed to miss an opportunity. It’s long over due for Turkey to support its NATO partner(s). No matter what they wish to think - Kurds are not Turks and Mosul does not belong to Turkey.

And, in the last analysis, there is no compelling historic justification for modern day Iraq. The 1919 Paris Peace Conference and subsequently the San Remo Conference in April of 1920 laid the groundwork for an Iraqi nation. Before 1919 there was no Iraq. There was no Iraqi nationalism and no Iraqi identity. There was what the British called Mesopotamia - referring to the Ottoman Empire’s provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. It was not until 1922 that the League of Nations confirmed statehood on Iraq that it became a Nation and legal entity. In 1932 Iraq joined the League of Nations. Hence, the partition of Iraq between the Kurds (Mosul), Sunni (Baghdad), and Shia (Basra), is not only a pragmatic solution to help end the Iraqi conflict, it is a historical imperative to correct past indiscretions and the myth of a greater Arabia. To believe that Kurds, Sunni, and Shia can live peacefully together contradicts every realty.

Just as Bosnia became a failed state when Muslims, Serbs, and Croatians, where provided the excuse and means to choose the conditions under which they wished to live - similarly the Kurds, Sunni, and Shia, are doing so in Iraq today.

Hence, a solution to the Iraqi conflict is to partition the country and let the “Iraqi people” construct a new compact to determine their own destiny based on historic and current realities.

Kosovo Independence: Folly

Date: 27 April 2007 

Zeljka Mirkovic and her sister Myra of Celopek, Republika Srpska, Bosnia, have been planning a pilgrimage since they were little girls to the monument on the Field of Blackbirds, outside Pristina, Kosovo. But, they can’t go, since no Serb can travel freely in Kosovo today. They wanted to climb the bombed-out steps to the top, where they could look over the ancient battlefield and would find a weathered bronze plaque. It is a pictorial that describes the Battle of Kosovo, but moreover, it is an admonishment to every Serb alive today. It says, ‘ if you are a Serb, no matter who you are, or where you live, or what you do – you cannot call yourself a Serb unless you have set-foot on these hallow grounds.’

Kosovo is the historical “fatherland” of the Serbian people. Realty or myth, it is the sin quo non of Serbian identity. It has shaped Serbian historical and national consciousness since the 12th century. You cannot read Serbian history without appreciating the primary position Kosovo holds in the Serbian psychic. The Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Kosovo polije (Field of Blackbirds) is to Serbs, what Concord Bridge, Bunker Hill, the Alamo, and Gettysburg, are to Americans. 

A political solution for Kosovo is not independence or even ‘supervised independence.’ 

First, international law clearly supports Serbia’s right to sovereignty over Kosovo. Independence here is a contravention of international law, whereby territorial acquisition by conquest has been illegal since the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. And, it also seems to be a violation of the UN Charter, Chapter XII, Article 78, which codifies that trusteeship, (like that established for Kosovo) shall not apply to Member states. Moreover, when territory is in dispute, legal interpretation proffers, that claims based on territorial rights take precedent over claims based on demographics. And finally, under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which provided the legal basis for the current situation in Kosovo, ‘ the Serbian state is guaranteed international and territorial sovereignty.’ 

Second, Russian President, Vladimir Puttin, who opposes independence for Kosovo, has stated repeatedly that an independent Kosovo would set a precedent for unresolved conflicts in the former Soviet Union (and other similar disputes). On the surface, it would seem that Russia is on the wrong side of this issue in terms of their “self-interest.” The question of precedent could be used to their advantage. For example, if Kosovo can secede from a sovereign state, then the same argument can be applied to parts of the former Soviet Union, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and Transdniestria in Moldova. But upon further inspection, it is clear the Russian bear is up to its old tricks. Securing a win – win for itself no matter the outcome. On the one hand, if the west does recognize Kosovo’s independence, it is a green light for Russia to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia independence with an invasion of Georgia should that country intervene to stop its’ breakaway provinces. And, on the other hand, if Serbia is allowed to keep Kosovo, Russia has Serbia’s gratitude and maybe even a military base on Europe’s south flank. 

Still, the US Secretary of State thinks otherwise. Regarding a possible U.N. Security Council resolution, Secretary Rice said the United States wants “to work with Russia and, indeed, with the Serbs to make certain … that everybody understands that Kosovo is sui generis, that this is not a precedent for any other circumstances in which there might be a claim of independence,” but instead arises from “a very particular set of conditions” created by the Balkan war. One cannot help being struck by the paucity of understanding in evidence here about the profound and adverse consequences, both in the near and long term, which this act may engender. Together with an arrogance that if the US Secretary of State says it is not sui generis -- then it is not! Wherever there is a large minority within a State that seeks independence, there will now be the specter of a Kosovo exception. 

Third, to think the US and the European Union can buy off al-Qaeda and radical Islam by establishing a Muslim democracy in the Balkans is disingenuous and demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of the enemy and the fight against Islamic terrorism. The US and the European Union also thinks it can buy off the Serbs. The US Secretary has said discussions are under way with Serbia to ensure it understands that it “has nothing to fear from the international community” and “has everything to gain by closer association with Europe and with European institutions.” 

Fourth, is the cowardly canard that anything less than independence will invite violence. If a Nato force cannot maintain the peace in the hamlets of Kosovo after seven years of fortifying and reconnoitering, then it is time for Nato to disband. 

Finally, is the concern for the protection and rights of minorities in Kosovo. Secretary Rice said, ‘We now are in the process of working with all the parties, including the Kosovar government, which will need to help protect minority rights and religious sites and work to build a multiethnic state.’ Unfortunately, after seven years, the province of Kosovo is not ‘a blueprint for a stable, prosperous, and multi-ethnic state.’ On the contrary: violence against Serbs and other minorities occurs regularly; a multi-national force of 16,000 soldiers must protect minority villages and religious shrines, 24/7 and 365 days a year; minorities cannot travel outside their own neighborhoods and villages without Nato protection; and there is astronomical unemployment and a nonfunctioning private sector economy. 

In the final analysis, a political solution for Kosovo is to establish the “Republika Kosova,” which would be an “entity” of Serbia, just as the “Republika Srpska,” is an “entity” of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kosovo would not have independence, but it would have autonomy. The 1974 Yugoslav constitution did not recognize Kosovo as one of the six Yugoslav Republics within the state. This was critical since only Republics were given the right to succession. In other words, the right to independence was presaged in the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974.

 In sum, Kosovo independence is folly.